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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1010 
 ___________ 
 
 JAMES GEORGE DOURIS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-02836) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 13, 2012 
 Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: October 2, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 James George Douris appeals from an order or 
2 
 
orders1
I. 
 of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.  Because no substantial 
question is presented by his appeal, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s orders. 
 Because the parties are familiar with the facts of 
the case, we will set forth only those facts necessary 
to understanding the appeal.  Douris, who alleges a 
number of disabilities, filed a complaint against the 
State of New Jersey (“the State”) with claims stemming 
from an incident in which he was ticketed in May 2008 
for failure to wear a seat belt.  Before the State 
answered, Douris filed a First Amended Complaint.  In 
that complaint, Douris alleged that he was injured at 
the Hopewell Township Municipal Court and at the 
Lawrence Township Municipal Court when he tried to 
access those courts in order to contest his ticket.  He 
alleged that the courts were not compliant with Title 
                                                 
1 See Section II, infra. 
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II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132.  Douris’s complaint also 
alleged that the New Jersey Superior Court in Trenton 
was not ADA compliant, because the court papers were in 
small type.  In paragraph 20 of the amended complaint, 
Douris alleged that he was denied access to viewing a 
criminal trial at the Superior Court of New Jersey in 
New Brunswick, in violation of the ADA.   
 The State filed a motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint, arguing that Douris could not relitigate the 
propriety of his seat-belt ticket, due to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine,2
                                                 
2 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries, 
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (explaining that 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal court review of 
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 
before the district court proceedings commenced and 
inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments”).  At the time Douris filed his federal 
complaint, he had already contested his traffic ticket 
in municipal courts in New Jersey and lost, and had 
attempted to appeal the guilty finding in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey.  We agree that the District Court 
could not entertain an appeal of the guilty finding. 
 and that Douris’s other claims should 
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be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. 
R. Civ. P.”).  After a hearing, the District Court 
agreed, and dismissed the amended complaint with 
prejudice, with the exception of the allegations in 
paragraph 20 of the complaint, which the District Court 
dismissed without prejudice, as the allegations were 
unrelated to the remainder of the complaint.  The Court 
explained in its ruling that Douris could bring the 
claims raised in paragraph 20 in a new complaint, if he 
desired. 
 About a week later, Douris filed a “Motion to the 
Court to File a Second Amended Complaint.”  The motion 
argued that the District Court erred by dismissing his 
complaint without giving him an opportunity to file 
another amended complaint.  Douris attached a proposed 
Second Amended Complaint. A magistrate judge denied the 
motion as moot, stating that the matter was closed and 
that Douris had not sought leave to reopen.  Less than 
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a week later, Douris filed a document titled, 
“Plaintiff’s Motion as the Court Allowed Plaintiff the 
Right to Amend the First Amended Complaint with no Time 
Limit to Amend.” The District Court then entered an 
order denying Douris’s motion to file a second amended 
complaint, and stated that any claims he would like to 
raise related to paragraph 20 of the complaint “must be 
filed as a new complaint, rather than an amended 
complaint, to initiate a new case under a separate 
docket number.”  Douris appealed two days later. 
II. 
 We construe Douris’s “Motion to the Court to File a 
Second Amended Complaint”3
                                                 
3 It is not clear that the Magistrate Judge had the 
authority to decide Douris’s post-decision motion to 
amend his complaint.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), (B) 
(authorizing magistrate judge to hear and determine 
pretrial matters, and to conduct hearings and submit 
proposed findings of fact and recommendations for 
disposition in posttrial criminal matters); Colorado 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen Constr. 
Co., 879 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1989) (decisions in 
matters referred to magistrate judge under “additional 
duties” provision of § 636(b)(3) are not directly 
appealable to court of appeals).  Because Douris’s 
 and his “Motion as the Court 
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Allowed Plaintiff the Right to Amend the First Amended 
Complaint with no Time Limit to Amend” as motions to 
reconsider the District Court’s November 7, 2011 order 
dismissing his complaint.  Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 
201, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) (courts may consider post-
judgment motions as motions filed pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)). As each motion was 
filed within 28 days of the November 7th order, the 
time to appeal that order began to run “from the entry 
of the order disposing of the last [of the two] 
motion[s].”  Rule 4(a)(4)(A), Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure (“Fed. R. App. P.”).  We thus have 
jurisdiction to review the November 7th order, and the 
order denying Douris’s second motion to amend the 
complaint.4
                                                                                                                                                             
motion to amend his complaint was ultimately heard by 
the District Court, we will review that final order. 
 
    
4  We note that Douris’s notice of appeal mentions 
only the December 28, 2011 order denying his last 
motion.  Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), an 
appellant must “designate the judgment, order, or part 
thereof being appealed.”  Courts generally construe 
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III. 
 We first turn to the November 7th order granting 
the State’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint.  
Our review of a district court's order granting a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is 
plenary.  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 
230 (3d Cir. 2008).  To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must “plead[] factual content that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
                                                                                                                                                             
submissions from a pro se litigant liberally and hold 
them “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers.”  Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 
520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 
655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).  However, Douris is 
an experienced litigator.  See Douris v. Middletown 
Township, 293 F. App’x 130, 132-33 (2008) (district 
court did not err in denying in forma pauperis status 
based on Douris’s abusive filings).  Nevertheless, in 
this instance, we will give Douris the benefit of 
liberal construction.  Douris is cautioned that any 
future notices of appeal should conform to Rule 3.  
, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).  
We may affirm a district court for any reason supported 
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by the record.  Brightwell v. Lehman
 A. 
, 637 F.3d 187, 191 
(3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 
 We agree that Douris’s claims against the New 
Jersey Superior Court failed to state a claim for 
relief under the ADA.  In order to state a claim for 
relief under Title II of the ADA, “a plaintiff must 
allege: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a 
disability; (2) that he was either excluded from 
participation in or denied the benefits of some public 
entity's services, programs, or activities or was 
otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that such 
exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by 
reason of his disability.”  
Claims Involving the New Jersey Superior Court 
Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 
24, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Parker v. Universidad 
de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2000)); 42 
U.S.C. § 12132.  Douris’s complaint alleges facts that 
would establish that he is a qualified individual with 
a disability, but the complaint fails to plead factual 
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matter that would allow the Court to infer that he was 
“excluded from participation” or “denied benefits” at 
the Superior Court because of his disabilities. 
 The amended complaint alleges that Douris appealed 
his seat-belt violation at “the State Superior Court in 
Trenton New Jersey at such time the access to the Court 
was not accessible to Douris in his wheelchair,” and 
that he was “unable to proceed with the appeal and the 
appeal died.”  Amended complaint, dkt. #4-1, ¶5.  The 
complaint does not explain why or when the court was 
inaccessible, but Douris explained at oral argument in 
the District Court that “there were some bird droppings 
that were bothersome to him, so he didn’t enter one 
day,” and that “there were issues with moving up and 
down to different floors; there’s elevators, but they 
may be mechanical and there may be a need for sheriff’s 
officers to help Mr. Douris.”  Dist. Ct. Op., dkt. #68, 
at 5.  Thus, it appears that Douris was not excluded 
from the courthouse; rather, he chose not to enter, and 
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when he did enter, he was assisted when he needed to 
move between floors. 
 The amended complaint alleges that the New Jersey 
courts failed to provide him with legal counsel, but 
there is no requirement under the ADA that courts 
provide legal counsel for a person with disabilities.  
Whether counsel should have been provided is a matter 
that could have been litigated within the appeal from 
Douris’s conviction. 
 The amended complaint alleges that the “papers and 
legal case law” at the Superior Court in Trenton were 
not readable, presumably because the type was too 
small.  It is not clear whether Douris sought any 
accommodations; e.g., by asking that specific legal 
provisions be enlarged.  Further, Douris’s complaint 
concedes that when he had trouble reading court orders, 
the judge rewrote them in larger print so that he could 
see them.  Amended complaint, dkt. #4-1, ¶19.  Thus, 
Douris’s complaint does not show that he was excluded 
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from participation in the appeal because of the small 
type. 
 Douris’s amended complaint also alleged that he was 
unable to access the Superior Court in New Brunswick on 
an unknown date as a public viewer because there were 
“locked doors.”  Douris does not allege factual matter 
that would allow the court to infer that he was 
excluded from the proceeding because of his disability.  
If the doors were locked, then nobody would have been 
able to enter the court, disability or no disability. 
 B. Claims Involving New Jersey Municipal Courts
 Along with its motion to dismiss, the State of New 
Jersey provided affidavits and certifications to 
support the motion with regard to claims involving the 
municipal courts.  Douris also provided numerous 
exhibits in connection with his responses.  “[B]ecause 
the District Court reviewed affidavits and other 
documents outside of the pleadings in evaluating [the 
State’s] motion to dismiss, we review the record 
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pursuant to Rule 56 [of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure].”  Albright v. Virtue, 273 F.3d 564, 570 (3d 
Cir. 2001); Rule 12(b)(6).  We review a district 
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using the 
same standard as the district court.  Pichler v. UNITE
 Summary judgment was appropriate here on the claims 
involving the municipal courts.  The State of New 
Jersey, the only named defendant, provided affidavits 
noting that the Hopewell Township Municipal Court and 
the Lawrence County Municipal Court are under the 
control and authority of Hopewell Township and Lawrence 
Township, respectively, and not under the control of 
the State of New Jersey.  
, 
542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate if the record reveals “no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
See also N.J. Stat. Ann. 
2B:12-15 (“Suitable courtrooms, chambers, offices, 
equipment and supplies for the municipal court, its 
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administrator's office and its violations bureau shall 
be provided by the municipality or by a county that has 
established a central municipal court.”).  Thus, 
Douris’s allegations that he was injured at those 
courts, and that those courts are not ADA-compliant, 
are not proper claims against the State of New Jersey.5
 C. 
 
 Douris’s amended complaint also contained claims 
pursuant to the state’s law against discrimination.  
Because the District Court properly dismissed all of 
the federal claims, the Court did not abuse its 
discretion in dismissing the state-law claims as well.  
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
                                                 
5 Claims under Title II of the ADA are subject to 
the statute of limitations for personal injury claims 
in the state in which they are raised.  Disabled in 
Action of Pa. v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 
2008).  New Jersey has a two-year statute of 
limitations for personal injury claims.  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. 2A:14-2.  It thus appears that most, if not all, 
of Douris’s claims are barred by the statute of 
limitations.  Because the statute of limitations is an 
affirmative defense, and because the State did not 
raise the issue in the District Court, we do not rely 
on the untimeliness of the claims as a basis for 
affirming the District Court’s dismissal. 
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28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).6
IV. 
 
 In his post-dismissal motions to amend his 
complaint, Douris argues that the District Court should 
have given him an opportunity to amend his complaint 
before dismissing (the bulk of) his claims with 
prejudice.  We agree.  “[I]f a complaint is subject to 
a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit 
a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be 
inequitable or futile.”  Phillips
                                                 
6 We also affirm the District Court’s decision to 
deny injunctive relief.  Douris apparently clarified at 
oral argument that he sought an injunction against 
officers issuing him tickets in the future for not 
wearing his seat belt.  Whether Douris is required to 
wear a seat belt is a matter that was considered by the 
state courts when Douris contested his traffic 
violation, and we do not discern any violation of the 
ADA in New Jersey's enforcement of the seat belt laws.  
See N.J. Stat. Ann. 39:3-76.2g (providing exception to 
seat belt requirement if "driver or passenger possesses 
a written verification from a licensed physician that 
the driver or passenger is unable to wear a safety seat 
belt system for physical or medical reasons"). 
, 515 F.3d at 245-46 
(citation omitted).  We need not remand for further 
proceedings, however, because Douris submitted his 
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proposed amended complaint to the District Court, and 
his proposed amendment does not cure the defects that 
we have discussed above. 
 
 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons given by 
the District Court, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.     
